Bridging the Gap: Defining the Debtor's
Status during the Involuntary Gap Period
Joseph Mullint
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code ("the Code")' seeks to achieve
both efficiency and equity in allocating legal rights between
debtors and creditors. In theory, the Code serves the interests of
all parties by protecting the debtor's estate from both noncooperative behavior by individual creditors and dishonesty of management by the debtor. The Code accomplishes these purposes
through an orderly system of claim management, with assigned
priorities and substantial oversight by the bankruptcy court.
Through the procedure of involuntary bankruptcy, the Code
allows creditors to force a debtor into bankruptcy when the
debtor fails to pay debts as they come due.2 Creditors rely on
this provision primarily when they believe that a debtor may
dissipate the estate through dishonesty or incompetence. Although both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies are governed by the same provisions once the court orders a debtor into
bankruptcy, the involuntary procedure leaves a "gap period"
between the filing of the involuntary petition and the court's
decision to order relief.' Under current law, the ability of the
"gap debtor"4 to execute certain business operations is uncertain.
This uncertainty may threaten the viability of the debtor's business, despite the lack of any action by the bankruptcy court. In
addition, the ambiguity of the gap period affects certain ordinary
business agreements that feature arrangements contingent on
the debtor's insolvency.5

t BA. 1992, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of Chicago.
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598 (1978), codified at 11 USC §§ 101 et seq
(1988 & Supp 1992).
2 See 11 USC § 303 (h).
If the bankruptcy court approves the involuntary petition and orders the debtor
into bankruptcy, it issues an "order for relief." Otherwise, it dismisses the petition. 11
USC § 303.
4 The term "gap debtor" will be used in this Comment to mean the debtor during the
period between the filing of an involuntary petition and the final order for relief. "Gap
creditor" means a creditor during the same period.
' The significance of the bankruptcy rules is not limited to financially troubled enti-
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This Comment maintains that neither creditor nor debtor
interests are served by ambiguity in the scope of permissible
debtor behavior during the gap period. The content of these legal
rules is also significant because it will affect the incentives
governing debtor-creditor relations, both before and after filing
the petition. Although involuntary bankruptcies account for only
a small percentage of total bankruptcies,6 they may be more
likely to involve significant assets.7 In addition, many private
creditor-debtor settlements may result from threats of involuntary proceedings.8 The precarious position of a gap debtor thus
presents an opportunity for individual creditors to exploit a
vulnerable debtor's position with threats of an involuntary petition, coercing deals that favor individual creditor interests over
those of the estate as a whole.
The Code fails to delineate the respective rights of creditors,
the debtor, and those who conduct business with the debtor
during the gap period. This Comment argues that debtors should
have the authority to issue secured debt for reasonably equivalent value during the gap period without court approval. This
position is consistent with the Code's language as well as its
overall purpose of preserving the viability of the debtor's business. Requiring court approval could threaten the survival of the
gap debtor's business by upsetting already fragile commercial
relationships. It would also violate basic notions of fairness, since
the petition filed is not an authoritative disposition of the
debtor's suitability for bankruptcy.

ties. For example, large commercial banks frequently enter into liquidity agreements with
issuers of asset-backed commercial paper in which the banks agree to lend money to fulfill
the issuers' cash-flow obligations. Moody's Investors Services, Inc., a powerful bond rating
agency, has recently begun to insist that banks agree to continue to lend money on a
secured basis for 30 days into the gap period. Public FinanceBankers Upset: Say Moody's
CriteriaChanged, Global Guaranty 1 (June 21, 1993). This is one example of an "outsideof-bankruptcy" commercial relationship that must consider the possibility of an involuntary filing.
6 See Lynn M. Lopucki, Strategies for Creditors in Bankruptcy Proceedings § 2.8 at
77 n 1 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1991); Robin E. Phelan and Mark X. Mullin, Involuntary
Bankruptcy, in Daniel R. Cowans, 2 Cowans Bankruptcy Law and Practicech 14, § 14.1 at
697 (West, 1989). One explanation for the small number of involuntary filings is that
there is a collective action problem preventing individual creditors from expending resources to file the petition where the benefit inures to the entire creditor pool.
7 Phelan and Mullin, Involuntary Bankruptcy § 14.1 at 698. Because filing an involuntary petition is more expensive to individual creditors than a voluntary petition, it is
likely that more substantial assets are available in involuntary bankruptcies--otherwise,
the involuntary petition would not be worthwhile.
8
See Lopucki, Strategiesfor Creditors§ 2.16.4 at 126-30.
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Section I of this Comment introduces the statutory provisions applicable to an involuntary bankruptcy and explains the
particular importance of clarifying the law that governs the gap
period. Section II examines the significant unresolved issues of
secured lending and court approval that a debtor confronts while
attempting to continue business operations during the gap period. It then discusses the inadequacy of current court treatment of
the gap period. Finally, Section III proposes a new approach to
the gap period problem that better serves the Code's twin goals of
efficiency and equity.

I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Statutory Background
This subsection describes the statutory provisions applicable
to involuntary bankruptcies, highlighting ambiguities in the Code
that hinder the gap debtor's ability to enter into potentially beneficial transactions.
1. Section 303: the involuntary petition.
Section 303 of the Code describes the procedures through
which a debtor may be forced into bankruptcy, and to some extent establishes the duties and powers of the debtor during the
gap period.' Under § 303, creditors may file an involuntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 (liquidation)0 or Chapter 11 (reorganization)." Filing creditors must themselves meet certain
prerequisites in number and aggregate claim amount,' although courts are often flexible in enforcing these requirements. 3 The debtor may contest the bankruptcy petition, and

See 11 USC § 303.
10

11 USC §§ 701 et seq.

n 11 USC §§ 1101 et seq.
11 USC § 303(b)(1) requires at least three petitioning creditors whose debts aggregate at least $5,000 in unsecured debt. The debts may not be contingent or subject to a
bona fide dispute. If there are fewer than 12 creditors, special provisions allow for a single
petitioning creditor. 11 USC § 303(b)(2).
13 See, for example, In re Molen Drilling Co., Inc., 68 Bankr 840 (Bankr D Mont
1987). In Molen Drilling, two of the three petitioning creditors sought to withdraw because they claimed they had been misled by the third. Id at 842. The court refused their
request, reasoning that "the Court may not permit a petitioning creditor to withdraw if to
do so would defeat the petition." Id. See also In re HutterAssociates, Inc., 138 Bankr 512,
516 (W D Va 1992) (holding that defects in the number of petitioning creditors may be
waived when the debtor fails to answer, and that such defects do not deprive the bankruptcy court of subject matter jurisdiction).
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the court will determine whether "the debtor is generally not
paying" debts as they become due "unless such debts are the
subject of a bona fide dispute ....,,i The period between the filing of the petition and the court's determination is known as the
involuntary gap period.
The length of the gap period depends upon both the court
calendar and the vigilance of the parties in pursuing their case.
Bankruptcy Rule 1013(a) provides that "[tihe court shall determine the issues of a contested petition at the earliest practicable
time and forthwith enter an order for relief, dismiss the petition,
or enter other appropriate orders."15 This rule, however, does
not guarantee a speedy adjudication of the debtor's status. Gap
periods have lasted over two years. 6 A survey of dismissed involuntary petitions found an average gap period of over a year.7
Such an extended gap period accentuates the importance of clarifying the rights and responsibilities of the gap debtor.
14 11 USC § 303(d), (h)(1). This test is often denoted "equity insolvency" and is distinguished from the traditional bankruptcy notion of balance-sheet insolvency, which compares total assets to total liabilities. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the equity
and balance-sheet definitions of insolvency, see John C. McCoid H,The Occasionfor InvoluntaryBankruptcy, 61 Am Bankr L J 195 (1987). See also Lawrence Ponoroff, Involuntary
Bankruptcy and the Bona Fides of a Bona Fide Dispute, 65 Ind L J 315, 329 (1990).
The "generally not paying debts" calculation is a question of fact for the bankruptcy
court. It "requires a more general showing of [a] debtor's financial condition and debt
structure than merely establishing the existence of a few unpaid debts." In re Dill, 731
F2d 629, 632 (9th Cir 1984). In 1984, Congress added the language excepting claims
subject to a "bona fide dispute" from the "generally not paying" determination. Pub L No
98-353, § 426(b), 98 Stat 333, 369 (1984). For a discussion of the bona fide dispute exception added by Congress in 1984, see In re Rimell, 946 F2d 1363, 1365-66 (8th Cir 1991),
cert denied as Rimell v Mark Twain Bank, 112 S Ct 2275 (1992). See also In re CLE
Corporation,59 Bankr 579, 584-85 (Bankr N D Ga 1986) (finding that "creative defenses"
to petitioning-creditor claims were not in good faith but were raised solely to defeat the
involuntary petition); In re Rubin, 769 F2d 611, 614-15 (9th Cir 1985) (concluding that the
undisputed-claims requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather a substantive element of
the petitioning creditor's case to be proved at trial); Ponoroff, 65 Ind L J 315.
15 1 USC Appendix, Rule 1013(a).
16 See, for example, In the Matter of R.C. Wynn, 889 F2d 644, 645 (5th Cir 1989) (25
months). The court, however, blamed the debtor for the delay, commenting that "he
gained a windfall by the delay and should be thankful that a trustee was not placed in
charge of his assets earlier." Id at 646.
'i The sample was drawn from the Prentice Hall Public Records-Combined Bankruptcy Filings database compiled by Prentice Hall Legal Financial Services. The set of
cases included 515 involuntary petitions from selected states that were added to the
database during 1988 and 1989. Of the 515 involuntary cases filed in that period, 205 had
been dismissed. Forty of those were selected at random. The mean gap period of the
sample was 12.7 months, with a standard deviation of 12.2 months. The results highlight
the variability of gap periods among districts with periods ranging from as low as one
month to as high as 48 months. In Texas, which represented half of the sample, the average gap period was 18.3 months, with a standard deviation of 14.3 months.
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As a protective measure, the court is authorized to "require
the petitioners ... to file a bond to indemnify the debtor" for
court costs and attorneys' fees upon dismissal. 8 In the case of a
bad faith filing, the court may award compensatory and punitive
damages to the debtor. 9 The legislative history of this provision
reveals an appreciation for the debtor's predicament:
The bonding requirement will discourage frivolous petitions
as well as spiteful petitions based on a desire to embarrass
the debtor (who may be a competitor of a petitioning creditor) or to put the debtor out of business without good cause.
An involuntary petition may put a debtor out of business
even if it is without foundation and is later dismissed. 0
The court is also authorized, upon the motion of a party in interest, to appoint an interim trustee during the gap period in Chapter 7 cases "if necessary to preserve the property of the estate or
to prevent loss to the estate."'
The clearest expression of Congressional intent to authorize
the gap debtor to continue normal business operations is found in
§ 303(f), which provides:
Notwithstanding section 363 of this title, except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, and until an order for
relief in the case, any business of the debtor may continue to
operate, and the debtor may continue to use, acquire, or
dispose of property as if an involuntary case concerning the
debtor had not been commenced.'
Although the sweeping language of this provision implies that
the filing of an involuntary petition does not restrict the gap
debtor, a careful reading indicates otherwise. Because § 303(f)
specifically mentions only § 363, it arguably may exempt the gap
debtor only from § 363, rather than from all the restrictions of
the Code. Indeed, this would be entirely logical; § 363 imposes
stringent notice and court approval requirements on debtors, and
thus it would be difficult, if not impossible, for many gap debtors
to function normally if they were bound by the strictures of §
363.' Despite disagreement over the scope of the exemption,
See 11 USC § 303(e), (i)(1).
See 11 USC § 303(i)(2).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, S Rep No 95-989, 95th Cong, 2a Sess 33 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5787, 5819.
21 11 USC § 303(g).
11 USC § 303(f).
2 For instance, § 363 prohibits the trustee from using, selling, or leasing property of
20
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however, the intent to relieve the gap debtor from burdensome
restrictions is unmistakably clear.
2. The interplay between § 362 and § 549(b).
Section 362 of the Code presents further complications for
the gap debtor, as it appears to forbid such debtors from obtaining secured credit. Section 362 automatically enjoins, in both
voluntary and involuntary petitions, proceedings by most creditors against the debtor's assets.2 The automatic stay provision
is critical because it prevents a "race to the debtor's assets"-one
of the central problems that the bankruptcy law seeks to
avoid.' Section 362 may hamper the debtor's business, however,
since it "operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of... (4)

any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate ... .2 Strict application of § 362(a)(4) would therefore foreclose the debtor's opportunity to obtain credit through
secured borrowing-even if such borrowing arose in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business.
Section 362 is apparently superseded by § 549(b),27 which
imposes limitations upon one of the avoidance powers that the
trustee may exercise after issuance of the order for relief: the
ability to rescind a post-petition transfer of estate property.2
the estate outside the ordinary course of business absent notice and a hearing. See 11
USC § 363(b). For business in the ordinary course, the trustee is generally authorized to
complete such transactions without notice and a hearing; however, the court reserves the
right to order otherwise. See 11 USC § 363(c). In addition, creditors with an interest in
the property of the estate may request court supervision of the use of such property. See
11 USC § 363(e).
2'This injunction is effective during the involuntary gap period because the creditor's
act of filing a petition triggers the § 362 automatic stay.
' Secured creditors, for example, will be prevented from exercising their repossession
rights upon default. See 11 USC § 362(a)(3)-(5).
11 USC § 362(a)(4). The term 'entity' includes person, estate, trust, governmental
unit, and United States trustee." 11 USC § 101(15).
'2 Section 549(b) only apparently supersedes § 362 because they are both facially
valid Code provisions that cannot be reconciled. Additionally, the sections are imprecisely
focused on two different situations. Section 362(a)(4) prohibits the act of lien creation,
while § 549(b) provides a defense to an avoidance action by the trustee. For a discussion
of the statutory and policy reasons why § 549(b) should dominate the dispute, see text
accompanying notes 70-75.
' 11 USC § 549(a) creates one of the several "avoiding powers" of the trustee. In addition to § 549, which governs post-petition transfers, there is § 544, which provides the
trustee with the "strong-arm" power of a hypothetical lien creditor; § 547(b), which applies
to preferential transfers; and § 548, which bars fraudulent conveyances. If a transfer is
avoided under any of these sections, the trustee may recover from the transferee the
property transferred or its value pursuant to § 550(a). For a detailed discussion of the
purposes and scope of the avoiding powers, see Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in
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Section 549(b) excepts from the post-petition avoidance power
a transfer made after the commencement of [an involuntary]
case but before the order for relief to the extent any value,
including services, but not including satisfaction or securing
of a debt that arose before the commencement of the case, is
given after the commencement of the case in exchange for
such transfer, notwithstanding any notice or knowledge of
the case that the transferee has.29
Thus, a gap debtor should arguably be able to transfer property
(including the grant of a security interest in property") notwithstanding the limitations of § 362. Furthermore, a secured gap
creditor should obtain all of the benefits of a secured lender
whether inside bankruptcy (following the order for relief) or outside of bankruptcy (following dismissal of the petition).
3. Priority in bankruptcy: § 502 and § 507.
Sections 502(f) and 507 of the Code, which respectively describe the allowance and priority of certain claims or interests,
introduce an additional statutory complication to involuntary
casds. Together with other sections of the Code, they establish a
hierarchical priority system, effectively dividing the debtor's
assets into four levels of priority claims relevant to this Comment."' The first priority is given to holders of non-avoided property rights-principally, fully secured creditors.32 Following satisfaction of these property interests, the Code grants next priority
to administrative expenses incurred in preserving the estate.'

Bankruptcy, 36 Stan L Rev 725 (1984).
" 11 USC § 549(b) (emphasis added). Although inartfully worded, § 549(b) is effectively a defense against the avoiding powers of the trustee that arise following the order
of relief. Recognizing that Congress almost certainly intended § 549(b) to exempt the gap

period from § 549(a), courts have corrected Congress's likely drafting error. See, for
example, In re Rainbow Music, Inc., 154 Bankr 559, 562 (Bankr N D Cal 1993).
' 11 USC § 101 provides that "transfer' means every mode... of disposing of or
parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a

security interest...."
" For simplicity, this Comment ignores the remaining levels of priority, which are
unaffected by the policies discussed. For example, § 726(b) subordinates administrative
expenses incurred under Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 administrative expenses incurred
following the conversion of a case from reorganization to liquidation.
See 11 USC § 725.
See 11 USC § 507(aX1). First-priority administrative expenses primarily consist of
the "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case...." 11
USC § 503(b)(1)(A). Gap claims under § 502(f) are explicitly excluded from the list of qual-
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Once these claims are satisfied in full, priority passes to "unsecured claims allowed under section 502(f) of [the Code]." '
Claims in this category are referred to as second-priority expense
claims. Finally, several other miscellaneous claims receive special
treatment under § 507"5 before the estate is divided pro rata
among the unsecured creditors pursuant to § 726."
Section 502(f) states that "in an involuntary case, a claim
arising in the ordinary course of the debtor's business or financial
affairs [during the gap period] shall be determined... the same
as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the
petition." 7 The net effect of § 502(f), *then, is to give a gap
debtor's unsecured creditors second-priority expense claims.38 In
many cases, there may not be significant assets remaining at this
level, particularly if the first-priority administrative expenses are
expected to be large. Subordination of § 502(f) claims to firstpriority administrative expenses thus hinders the gap debtor's
ability to obtain unsecured credit.
Even if the debtor can assure gap creditors that funds will be
available for the satisfaction of second-priority claims, the § 502(V
requirement that claims arise "in the ordinary course of business" further limits the gap debtor's ability to obtain credit.39
Courts use either of two tests to decide whether a transaction
occurs in the ordinary course of business: the horizontal test or
the vertical test. The horizontal, or industry-wide, test involves a
"comparison of this debtor's business to other like businesses."0

ifying administrative expenses. 11 USC § 503(b).
See 11 USC § 507(a)(2).
"
See 11 USC § 507(a)(3)-(8). The claims that follow second-priority expense status in
§ 507(a) are, in order: certain allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions; specified allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan;
the allowed unsecured claims of grain producers and fishermen; allowed unsecured claims
of individuals for purchases made for personal, family, or household use; certain allowed
unsecured claims of governmental units; and allowed unsecured claims based on commitments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation,
the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Federal Reserve
Board. Id.
' See 11 USC § 726(a) and (b).
37 11 USC § 502(f).
' In re Advanced Electronics, Inc., 107 Bankr 503, 505-06 (Bankr M D Pa 1989),
offers a paradigmatic case of § 502(f) ordinary course expenses. The court treated the gapperiod wage claims of the debtor's employees as second-priority expenses. Id.
" The concept of ordinary-course business expenses is used throughout the Code.
This Comment assumes that "ordinary course" has a consistent application in the relevant
Code sections. Consistency is an important feature for certainty in Code interpretation.
See Dewsnup v Timm, 112 S Ct 773, 786-88 (1992) (Scalia dissenting).
" In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 Bankr 612, 618 (Bankr S D NY 1986). This case
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The vertical, or creditor's expectation, test looks to whether the
transaction subjects a hypothetical creditor to an economic risk
not anticipated when extending credit to the debtor.4"
Both tests place serious restrictions on the ability of the gap
debtor to engage in conduct outside the scope of normal, everyday
business transactions. In In re Lite Coal Mining Co.,42 a voluntary case, the court found that the extension of large amounts of
credit during a bankruptcy proceeding did not occur in the ordinary course of business, where the coal-mining debtor:
used the post-petition loans to purchase numerous expensive
items of equipment, yet.., mined only 4,000 to 5,000 tons
of coal during the course of their post-petition business, at a
mine site where it never even obtained a signed or complete
lease."
This standard provides little solace to the gap debtor or to potential creditors because it relies not only on the preexisting relationship between the parties, but also on the ability of the gap
debtor to continue operations. The standard may also require a
gap debtor to decline an opportunity that does not fall clearly
within the bounds of prior activity, even though the opportunity
would allow a beneficial extension of the debtor's business.
One particularly important expense outside the ordinary
course of business is attorneys' fees. In In re Manufacturer's
Supply Co., the president of a Chapter 7 debtor sought reimbursement of $2,000 he had advanced the debtor during the involuntary gap period to pay counsel's retainer.' The court found
the transaction was outside the ordinary course of business and,

held that hiring political lobbyists was in the ordinary course of business of a large Fortune 500 mining, manufacturing, and production company where a substantial number of
similar companies routinely lobbied Congress. Id at 613, 618-19.
41 Id at 616. The test has also been phrased as "whether 'the transaction is within the
day-to-day business of the debtor without some kind of separate authorization.'" Id at 617,
quoting In re Waterfront Companies, Inc., 56 Bankr 31, 35 (Bankr D Minn 1985). This almost necessarily involves looking at the debtor's pre-petition business practices. JohnsManville, 60 Bankr at 617. The Johns-Manville court reasoned that the debtor's prior
lobbying efforts would alert the creditors that the debtor would likely continue to engage
in these activities and might even find the need to expand its lobbying efforts. Id at 61819.
42 122 Bankr 692 (Bankr N D W Va 1990).
4' Id at 695 (citation omitted). See also In re Lockwood Enterprises, Inc., 52 Bankr
871 (Bankr S D NY 1985). In Lockwood, the court refused to classify money borrowed to
meet payroll and operating expenses as an ordinary-course expense, because there was no
evidence that such borrowing was the debtor's pre-petition practice. Id at 874.
41 132 Bankr 127, 127-28 (Bankr N D Ohio 1991).
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therefore, not entitled to either administrative-expense or secondpriority status.45 In In re Hanson Industries, Inc., the court

classified the majority of the gap debtor's legal bills (and all those
expended in combatting the involuntary petition) as general unsecured claims since they arose outside of the ordinary course of
business.' This hostility to offering financial protection for an
unsuccessful debtor's counsel during the gap period suggests that
counsel will either demand an immediate retainer (which requires cash on hand)47 or work only on a contingency fee basis. 8 This situation raises doubts about the gap debtor's ability
to mount an effective defense, even when its position is meritorious.
4. Does the gap debtor qualify as a trustee under § 364?
The most controversial statutory ambiguity confronting a
Chapter 11 gap debtor concerns the applicability of provisions
that do not specifically mention involuntary debtors, but rather
refer generally to the trustee. The fundamental question is
whether a gap debtor qualifies as a debtor-in-possession and thus
has the powers and responsibilities of a trustee.49 If so, the gap
debtor, as trustee, will assume substantial burdens, 0 but will
also realize significant benefits.
The most significant of these advantages comes from § 364,
which grants the trustee expansive power to obtain post-petition
credit if it first receives court approval.5 ' In addition to the §
364(a) authorization of unsecured debt in the ordinary course of
business (a provision not applicable to the gap debtor), § 364(c)
provides that the court may authorize the obtaining of credit: "(1)
"' Id at 128-29.
46 90 Bankr 405, 413-17 (Bankr D Minn 1988).
4
A retainer also provides inadequate financial protection since it is a transfer of
money in exchange for the promise of future services.
" 90 Bankr at 416-17. Upon successful defense against a petition, debtor's counsel
would take a percentage of the judgment against petitioners under § 303(i).
"' In voluntary cases filed under Chapter 11, the debtor normally retains its current
management, at least initially. In such a case, where no qualified person is serving as
trustee and the debtor is left in possession of its business and property, § 1101 declares
the debtor a "debtor-in-possession." Section 1107 provides that a debtor-in-possession
shall have the rights, powers, and responsibilities of a trustee.
' See generally Raymond T. Nimmer and Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business
Governance:FiduciaryDuties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 Bankr Dev
J 1 (1989).
" See 11 USC § 364. For a general discussion of § 364 as it applies to Chapter 11 reorganizations, see Comment, Extending Post.PetitionCredit to Reorganizing Debtors: Understandingthe Tricks and Traps of Bankruptcy Code Section 364, 1990 Utah L Rev 93.
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with priority over any or all administrative expenses... ; (2)
secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise
subject to a lien; or (3) secured by a junior lien on property of the
estate that is subject to a lien."52 Section 364(d) also empowers
the court to grant a senior lien on encumbered property if the
trustee is otherwise unable to obtain credit and if adequate protection is afforded the lien creditor. In addition to the protection
of the automatic stay, the enhanced prospect of obtaining credit
under § 364 creates a significant incentive for firms to enter
bankruptcy.5 3 Qualifying as a trustee will greatly enhance the
gap debtor's ability to obtain credit.5 4
5. Summary.
The provisions of the Code that govern involuntary bankruptcies set forth the basic mechanics of commencing an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, but also produce considerable ambiguity concerning the debtor's ability to conduct business during
the gap period. First, § 303(f) seems to reflect a Congressional
desire to leave the gap debtor largely able to continue normal
business operations. However, the fact that the section specifically exempts the debtor only from the constraints of § 363 suggests
that the gap debtor's power may be nearly as curtailed as that of
the voluntary debtor. Second, the interplay of §§ 362 and 549(b)
jeopardizes the ability of the gap debtor to obtain secured credit.
Third, the courts' varying treatment of the "ordinary course of
business" requirement of § 502(f) severely curtails the gap
debtor's ability to obtain any credit. Finally, resolving the question whether a gap debtor qualifies as a trustee would have substantial effects on the debtor's powers during the gap period.
B. Policy Issues
The description of the costly ambiguities in the Code's treatment of gap debtors reveals where the Code could stand improve11 USC § 364(c).
See Michelle Singletary, Buoyed by Bankruptcy: A Rising Number of Firms Are
Using the Courts to Keep Afloat, Wash Post Dl (Feb 6, 1992) ("Unlike most consumers
who find it hard to get credit after filing for bankruptcy protection, many companies are
able to borrow from banks and are increasingly using bankruptcy as a major financing

tool.").
"
sions,
reject
are at

The potential trustee status of the gap debtor implicates several other Code proviincluding § 365, which empowers the trustee, with court approval, to assume or
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. This and other provisions
least facially inconsistent with § 303(f).
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ment. The following discussion of policy concerns relating to the
gap debtor's status provides some suggestions as to why and how
the gap debtor's powers should be specified. The debtor's status
during the involuntary gap period raises several policy questions
that animate the analysis of this Comment. Consideration of
these questions depends upon the purpose and ideal timing of the
involuntary petition."
The vast majority of bankruptcies are voluntary. 5 There
are a number of explanatory theories, but the prevailing view is
that creditors are just as reluctant as debtors to enter into bankruptcy. Major creditors know that the debtor's business depends
upon its reputation, and that it will have great difficulty operating after the filing of the involuntary petition. 7 Creditors may
thus prefer to postpone filing an involuntary petition in order to
maximize the value of the estate and perhaps avoid a significant
loss. Individual creditors, however, may place their interests
above those of the estate as a whole and force the debtor into
bankruptcy.5 8 The direct and indirect costs of a bankruptcy
filing 9 suggest that bankruptcy should be avoided whenever the

For a more detailed discussion, see Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law 193-208 (Harvard, 1986).
In 1983, for example, involuntary petitions accounted for 1,804 of the 349,232 total
bankruptcy filings, 58,986 of which were business bankruptcies. Statistical Analysis Division, United States Bankruptcy Courts, Table F-2A (1984), cited in Jackson, The Logic
and Limits of Bankruptcy Law at 206 n 42.
', See Phelan and Mullin, Involuntary Bankruptcy § 14.1 at 697-98 (cited in note 6).
Although the collective interests of the creditors should govern the court's decision
as to whether to grant an order for relief, the ability of non-petitioning creditors to protect
their interests is extremely limited. In In re Royal Gate Associates, Ltd., 81 Bankr 165,
167 (Bankr M D Ga 1988), the court stated that "[a] creditor does not have standing to
oppose an involuntary bankruptcy petition."
"' See Edward I. Altman, A FurtherEmpirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J Finance 1067 (1984). Altman conducted an empirical study of direct and
indirect bankruptcy costs in voluntary proceedings. Direct bankruptcy costs include "legal,
accounting, filing and other administrative costs." Id. Indirect costs include managerial
opportunity costs and the loss of sales and profits when potential buyers perceive that
default is likely, and the higher cost of credit or inability to obtain credit. Id at 1071. "On
average, bankruptcy costs ranged from 11% to 17% of firm value up to three years prior to
bankruptcy." Id at 1087. See also Banks and Bankruptcy: So Long, Old Buddy, The
Economist 83 (Feb 8, 1992), which adds that other bankruptcy costs include "the potential
loss of valued customers and employees, the distraction of management, and the court's
influence on operating decisions." For an empirical example demonstrating that a reorganization need not result in excessive bankruptcy costs, see Steven N. Kaplan,
Federated'sAcquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications (unpublished 1994) (on
file with U Chi L Rev).
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debtor suffers only from a temporary liquidity problem'e or
where a non-bankruptcy restructuring is possible.6
Some involuntary filings, however, are desirable. Under
certain circumstances, the involuntary petition is a necessary
measure to forestall a destructive race to the debtor's assets. For
example, a secured creditor may intend to exercise its foreclosure
power to repossess essential property. Other creditors may quickly follow, fearing their claims will disappear. The debtor could be
unwilling or unable to object. It is important, therefore, that
creditors have some mechanism to prevent such a race.
A related concern involves debtor misbehavior. All parties
should encourage the debtor to behave in a manner that will
maximize estate value. In some cases, however, it may be difficult to differentiate between maximizing actions and preferential
transfers. 2 A practical approach to the gap period must accommodate the legitimate interests of creditors by reining in debtor
behavior without violating the equitable rights of the debtor to
salvage its business.
The final general policy issue concerns the relationship between voluntary and involuntary petitions. Since most bankruptcies are voluntarily initiated by the debtor, involuntary bankruptcies are open to a variety of interpretations. They may be seen as
purely aberrational, as a failure of the system to provide for the
preferred bankruptcy procedure, or as a successful response to a
specific, but relatively rare set of circumstances. Conversely, the
existence of the involuntary petition undoubtedly gives a creditor
leverage to push the debtor into voluntary bankruptcy and can be
an important factor in pre-bankruptcy negotiations. Voluntary
and involuntary bankruptcies need not receive perfectly parallel
treatment, but it is important that they serve their respective

' Some financial economists consider this a specious argument, because if the debtor
faced simply a short-term liquidity problem, the debtor should be able to generate the
necessary liquidity in the capital markets. See Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law at 198 (cited in note 55). Such an argument, however, relies on a stylized view
of efficient capital markets that may not be applicable to all debtors. The most significant
barrier for the gap debtor may be that the firm's true value is private, nonveriflable
information preventing the debtor from effectively accessing the capital markets.
"1 But see Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v Western Union Telegraph Co., 786 F2d
794, 802-03 (7th Cir 1986) (Easterbrook concurring). Judge Easterbrook argues that the
majority of bankruptcy costs are associated with financial distress rather than formal
bankruptcy proceedings. As a result, non-bankruptcy restructuring may be just as costly,
or more so, than actual bankruptcy. Judge Easterbrook does not, however, consider the
costs of either process to be unduly restrictive. Id.
' Section 547 outlines the trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers. See note
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purposes in a manner consistent with common bankruptcy goals.
To that end, the ambiguity of the gap period is destructive because it prevents involuntary bankruptcy from being an attractive option in those cases in which it is, in fact, the best alternative. Courts should interpret the involuntary gap in accordance
with these policy concerns by taking into account the dynamic
effect that involuntary bankruptcy rules have on voluntary bankruptcies and business relations.
Moving beyond the abstract policy concerns, the most important practical problem lies in identifying the optimal level of
credit which should be available to the debtor for investment
during the gap period. Unless the involuntary petition is entirely
frivolous, gap debtors will be experiencing some level of economic
or financial distress. The debtor's incentives are to continue to
operate the business so as to retain control and maximize residual value, inside or outside of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy proceedings, however, may hamper the debtor's ability to finance positive
net present value projects and may therefore result in
underinvestment.6 3 Although creditors also seek to maximize
firm value, they recognize that providing credit to the debtor will
create additional claimants, thereby reducing their pro-rata
share." If granted second priority under § 507(a)(2), the gap
creditors will be even more destructive to petitioning creditor
interests. Pre-petition creditors will also be concerned by the
debtor's incentive to engage in risky projects that have a negative
net present value. 5
This conflict between debtors and creditors is a standard
agency problem associated with capital structure, but the conflict
intensifies during insolvency. 6 Generally, all interested parties
should agree to the expenditure of additional resources on a positive net present value project. Problems arise to the extent the
debtor has perverse incentives to gamble the estate's residual
value on an overly risky project. However, the presence of parties
willing to invest new resources into the business following the
' See Robert Gertner and David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of
ReorganizationLaw, 46 J Finance 1189, 1191 (1991).

See 11 USC § 726.

This problem is commonly called "risk alteration." For a discussion of this issue,
see William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organizationand Finance: Legal
and Economic Principles 326-30 (Foundation, 4th ed 1990). For numerical examples and
game theoretic analysis of debtor and creditor misbehavior, see Randal C. Picker, Security
Interests,Misbehavior,and Common Pools, 59 U Chi L Rev 645 (1992).
' See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing, 46 Vand L Rev 901, 912-14 (1993).
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filing of an involuntary petition suggests that the "new" investors
have made an independent evaluation of the proposed use of the
new credit and will have proper monitoring incentives. 7
These questions have not been the subject of extensive litigation or scholarship, nor is there an explicit or recognized disagreement among the federal courts. What is apparent, both from
the cases which have arisen and the Code itself, is that a number
of unresolved issues confront debtors and creditors involved in an
involuntary proceeding, potential debtors and creditors who must
anticipate the gap period, and ultimately, the courts that must
resolve the conflicts. In such a sparsely litigated area, Congress
is unlikely to have considered the complexity of these statutory
ambiguities. It is therefore particularly important to consider the
policy arguments in support of each position. These policy concerns operate on two levels: system-wide concerns, and optimal
incentives for individual bankruptcy cases. The former include
averting a destructive race to the assets, preventing debtor misbehavior, and insuring equitable treatment for debtors and creditors. The latter include the practical problems of obtaining necessary credit for ongoing business operations and preventing frivolous or strategic involuntary filings.
II. APPROACHES TO SECURED BORROWING AND COURT APPROVAL
The major unresolved issue confronting a gap debtor concerns its authority to grant a security interest in property (or
otherwise transfer property) during the gap period without obtaining prior court approval. It is upon this specific issue that the
remainder of this Comment will focus. The issue is critical because of the unattractiveness of unsecured lending-unsecured
claims are subordinate to first-priority administrative expenses.
Presently, the ambiguity of the law produces considerable inefficiency, as it frequently leads gap debtors and prospective gap
creditors to seek court approval of secured lending transactions." Identifying the optimal solution to this ambiguity de-

' In addition, if the credit is secured, it has the benefit of reducing the risk-alteration tendency. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured
Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure:Comment, 34 J Finance 247, 250 (1979). Restrictions
in the security agreement may prevent asset substitution-that is, substituting low-risk
assets with higher-risk assets. Id.
' For example, in In re Shah International,Inc., 94 Bankr 136, 136-37 (Bankr E D
Wis 1988), a gap debtor sought and received approval for securing the wages of its attorneys. Legal counsel for prospective gap creditors have been emphatically warned not to
lend to gap debtors absent court approval. The Practising Law Institute, for example, sug-
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pends upon one's view of the Code's purposes and limitations as
well as of the gap debtor's status.
.There are several possible approaches to secured lending
during the gap period. The most restrictive approach would
strictly apply § 362's prohibition on the creation and perfection of
liens and thus bar the debtor from secured borrowing. The second
view would permit secured borrowing without court approval, but
only to the extent of value-narrowly defined pursuant to §
549(b). The third position allows secured lending without court
approval, but with a broader understanding of value than currently prevails. Finally, the fourth position proposes the transformation of the gap debtor into a trustee/debtor-in-possession, with
all the consequent powers and duties of a trustee.
A. The Most Restrictive Solution: A Preclusive Interpretation of
§ 362
Section 362(a)(4) states that the filing of an involuntary
petition under § 303 automatically stays "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate." 9 To the
extent this describes a secured loan arrangement, it may require
court approval for secured borrowing during the gap period. This
position views the transfer-for-value exception of § 549(b) as
subordinate to § 362(d), which requires court approval to lift the
automatic stay. This position identifies the Code's principal purpose as the protection of the debtor's assets from destruction by a
dishonest or incompetent debtor, discounting the counterproductive effect of debtor paralysis during the gap period.
This restrictive approach should be rejected on both statutory and policy grounds. First, neither the legislative history nor
case commentary on § 362 contains any indication that the section was designed to prevent a transfer for value pursuant to §
549(b). A secured transaction is clearly a transfer for the purposes of the Code."0 In addition, the intent of § 303(f) runs contrary

gests the following guideline for dealing with a gap debtor: "Do not advance credit to an
alleged debtor... [during] the Involuntary gap period' [ I without obtaining an order
allowing the same from the bankruptcy court. The risks far outweigh the potential benefits." Robin E. Phelan, et al, Extending Trade Credit to a DIP: The Second Face of the
Devil, in Representing the Trade Creditorand Landlordin Chapter11 Cases, Commercial
Law and Practice Course Handbook No 632 at 153, 263 (Practising Law Institute, 1992).
See also Richard F. Broude, Chapter11 Financing,in ALI.ABA Course of Study: Modern
Real Estate Transactions 145, 152-53 (1992).
S11 USC § 362(a)(4).
70 In 11 USC § 101, the Code defines "transfer" to mean "every mode, direct or in-
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to this interpretation since it would be impossible for the gap
debtor to continue business operations as if the petition had not
been filed.7 Adoption of the preclusive approach would require
obtaining court approval to lift the automatic stay pursuant to §
362(d) before encumbering estate property. Section 362(d), however, was not intended to provide for this contingency; it primarily serves the needs of preexisting secured creditors that are denied adequate protection.72
The policy reasons for rejecting this approach are even more
compelling. From a commercial perspective, the need to seek
court approval impedes the debtor's ability to maintain the goingconcern value of its business. First, there are the transaction
costs associated with a hearing. Although these costs may be
insignificant, they will prevent consummation of marginally
profitable deals. Second, delay poses an additional cost, even
where the court will surely approve the deal. The debtor may
therefore be foreclosed from entering into profitable enterprises
that require a timely response.7" Third, there may be great uncertainty as to whether the court will approve the deal. This is
bothersome for prearranged contractual agreements and a deterrent to new contracting once the petition has been filed.74 Finally, allowing § 362 to trump § 549(b) would effectively paralyze
the debtor in many types of business operations. The estate
would be frozen as of the time the petitioning creditors filed for
bankruptcy, and the debtor's discretion would be more limited in
several respects than a debtor-in-possession who, at a minimum,
has the operating powers of a trustee. In light of these statutory

direct, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with

property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest
and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption ...
71 See text accompanying notes 20-22.
72 See Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 343-44
(1977); S Rep No 95-989 at 52-53 (cited in note 20).
"' This is particularly true for an issuer of commercial paper. As the company's
commitments come due, the need to seek court approval will only exacerbate the bankruptcy situation. See note 5.
14 The combined objections to requiring court approval raise the question
of why
court approval requirements should be tolerated following a voluntary petition, but not
during the gap period. Although the costs are largely the same, the cost-benefit balance is
different. First, the ambiguity surrounding the gap period places the gap debtor, in many
respects, in a more precarious position. Second, increasing the costs of business operations
during the gap period presents opportunities for strategic creditor behavior that are not
available in voluntary cases. See text accompanying notes 139-40. Finally, because a substantial percentage of involuntary petitions are ultimately dismissed, see note 17, it
wastes the court's time to sift through the gap debtor's ongoing business operations.
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and policy concerns, this approach has not been embraced by any
court and should not be accorded serious consideration. 5
B. The Prevailing View: In re Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture
and the Restrictive Value Definition
The prevailing view on secured lending and court approval,
as expressed in In re Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture,7" is fairly
conservative. It does not classify the gap debtor as a trustee, and
therefore does not require court approval for secured borrowing.
But it does enforce a narrow limit on the debtor's ability to transfer property during the gap period. In Roxy Roller, the court
confronted the debtor-as-trustee issue after a gap debtor requested court approval to grant a security interest in property in exchange for cash advances. Roxy was a joint-venture roller rink, in
which one of the partners filed a petition to force the joint venture into Chapter 11 bankruptcy." The filing of the involuntary
petition had a detrimental effect on the business, and Roxy was
ultimately forced to cease operations due to its lack of liability
insurance. '
In a prior proceeding, Roxy had sought financing to pay
"emergency expenses which must be paid in order for Roxy to
remain in a position to reopen. . . ."" Pursuant to § 364, the
prior court authorized the debtor to grant a security interest, but
the gap creditor failed to obtain the final order and did not execute a security interest. The court in Roxy Roller refused to grant

7' There appear to be no reported cases supporting this approach. In standard practice, however, parties regularly seek court approval. It is unclear whether these courts are
acting pursuant to § 362(d) in lifting the automatic stay; § 364, in authorizing the trustee
to procure credit, see text accompanying notes 49-54; or § 105, in invoking the general
equitable powers of the court.
76 73 Bankr 521 (Bankr S D NY 1987). The Roxy Roller case is the only reported
instance where the gap debtor's status as a § 364 trustee has been adjudicated. Roxy
Roller is cited in both the practitioner's literature and the scholarly literature. Practitioners accept the Roxy Roller court's view and plan their behavior accordingly. The scholarly literature has mixed views on the court's decision. For support, see David G. Epstein,
Steve H. Nickles, and James J. White, Bankruptcy 30 (West, 1993). For criticism, see Paul
M. Baisier and David G. Epstein, PostpetitionLending Under Section 364: Issues Regarding the Gap Period and Financingfor PrepackagedPlans,27 Wake Forest L Rev 103, 12021 (1992).
7
Roxy Roller, 73 Bankr at 522-23.
78 Id at 522.
19 Id at 523.
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a request for a nunc pro tunc order, 0 finding that § 364 did not
apply during the gap period.8 '
The court considered deeming the involuntary gap debtor a
trustee under § 364, but rejected this option because it felt the
freedom Congress granted to gap debtors under § 303(f) was
inconsistent with the duties and obligations imposed upon trustees.82 The court also suggested that court approval is not necessary under § 549 to the extent the security interest is
transferred for value," although court approval may provide
additional protection for the grant."
Under the Roxy Roller view, § 549(b) is a clear exception to
the automatic stay of § 362. If the transaction meets the requirement of § 549(b) that the transfer be for post-petition value,' the bankruptcy trustee will not be able to avoid the
transaction. Elaborating on the breadth of this exception, the
court in In re 222 Liberty Associates insisted that § 549(b) be
read very narrowly.8 8 "[T]he transferee is obliged to establish
that the transfer in issue should be allocated solely to post-petition value or services to protect the transfer."8 7 That court emphasized that transferees have generally been unsuccessful in
asserting this defense due to the "substantive and procedural
burdens" placed squarely on the transferee.' Such a narrow
finding limits the discretion of a debtor-even within the ordinary course of business-in conducting customary commercial
relationships that involve buying and selling on credit.
There are two strong, though inconsistent, criticisms of the
Roxy Roller approach. The first contends that Roxy Roller provides the gap debtor with insufficient power, while the second

' Nunc pro tunc ("now for then") is a "phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after
the time when they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the same effect as
if regularly done." Black's Law Dictionary 1069 (West, 6th ed 1990). For a discussion of
the standards used by courts in considering whether to authorize a nunc pro tunc order,
see text accompanying notes 141-44.
a'Roxy Roller, 73 Bankr at 525.
82 Id at 526-27.
'3 Id at 525-26.
8Id at 526 n2.
83 See 11 USC § 549(b).
88 94 Bankr 381, 382 (Bankr E D Pa 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 110 Bankr 686 (E
D Pa 1989). Given that the district court's reversal was on other grounds, 222 Liberty
Associates remains good authority for the narrow reading of the § 549(b) exception. See,
for example, In re Williams Contract Furniture,Inc., 148 Bankr 805, 808-09 (Bankr E D
Va 1992).
222 Liberty Associates, 94 Bankr at 382.
Id at 384.
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makes the more modest claim that Roxy Roller and the cases
following it define "value" too narrowly.
The first criticism begins with the proposition that § 364, far
from being a restriction, is a necessary expansion of the powers
of the gap debtor, despite the requirement of court approval.
Recall that § 364 aids in the essential task of obtaining credit
once the petition has been filed.89 The trustee is empowered under § 364 to seek court approval to issue debt with different levels of super-priority. In most cases, a lender is unlikely to provide
post-petition credit without receiving super-priority.' °
This view has both a legal and policy component. The legal
component interprets § 303 in conjunction with Chapter 11 so as
to transform the gap debtor into a debtor-in-possession with the
corresponding powers of a trustee. The policy component argues
that this is a necessary measure given the precarious position of
a gap debtor.
The central legal issue is whether the gap debtor is a "trustee" for the purposes of § 364. In a voluntary Chapter 11 case,
the pre-petition debtor normally becomes the post-petition debtor-in-possession, an actor with the powers and responsibilities of
a trustee. In a reorganization, the debtor is often in the best position to know the business and the firm's strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is in the creditors' best interests to allow the
debtor-in-possession to oversee the reorganization. Thus, § 303(f)
may affirm that the gap debtor is a debtor-in-possession; only
with these enhanced powers will the gap debtor be able to continue in business.9
Even if the gap debtor is a debtor-in-possession, not all of the
credit-enhancing provisions of § 364 will apply. For purposes of §
364 priority, there is a distinction between the status of ordinarycourse unsecured debt and all other types of debt. Section 364(a)
authorizes the trustee to incur unsecured debt in the ordinary
course of business as a first-priority administrative expense.92
Under §§ 507(a)(2) and 502(f), ordinary-course expenses incurred
during the gap period are accorded second-priority expense status.93 Therefore, it is impossible for both § 364(a) and § 502(f) to

"
'1
92

See text accompanying notes 51-54.
See text accompanying notes 63-67.
See also text accompanying notes 114-30.
See 11 USC § 364(a).

The precise degree of favorability depends on the total asset pool of the estate and
the amount of administrative expenses. See text accompanying notes 31-38.
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apply at the same time. This suggests that Congress did not
intend § 364(a) to apply to involuntary cases.9 4
The remainder of § 364, however, conceivably could apply to
the gap debtor since there are no explicit priority conflicts. Section 364(b) applies to unsecured debt incurred outside the ordinary course of business-debt that otherwise would have the
unfavorable priority of pre-petition unsecured debt.95 Section
364(c) and (d) authorize the bankruptcy court to grant varying
levels of super-priority, including liens secured by estate property, if the trustee is otherwise unable to obtain credit. Section
364(c) is the critical provision, because § 364(a) unsecured debt
may not be substantially superior to that provided by § 502(f).
The application of any of § 364's subsections, however, is inextricably tied to the gap debtor's status as trustee.
Policy concerns bolster the legal argument for interpreting §
364 to apply to the gap debtor. Specifically, the court oversight
and enhanced priority powers that § 364 allows may enable the
debtor to obtain the optimal level of financing during the gap
period and into bankruptcy.9 6 Thus, to meet its credit needs
both inside and outside the ordinary course of business, the debtor must have the powers of a trustee. The policy reasons for
applying § 364, however, do not consider the Roxy Roller view of
§ 549 or the approach advocated by this Comment, each of which
would produce other avenues for post-petition credit. If the debtor can obtain adequate levels of credit through these alternative
mechanisms, the credit-enhancing features of trusteeship would
create a superfluous complication.
The second major criticism of the Roxy Roller view is the
more modest claim that a narrow view of value provides too little
flexibility for the gap debtor. The narrow conception of value
under Roxy Roller makes it unlikely that a debtor can obtain the
optimal level of credit without court approval.9 7 Bankruptcy
Rule 6001 provides that "[alny entity asserting the validity of a
transfer under § 549 of the Code shall have the burden of

The same conflict is averted in 11 USC § 503(b), a specific exemption of "claims allowed under section § 502(f)" (ordinary-course gap claims) from administrative-expense
priority.
See text accompanying notes 31-43.
Some commentators, however, are skeptical of the courts' ability to make business
and financing decisions. See, for example, Triantis, 46 Vand L Rev at 914, 918-19 (cited in
note 66).
' See text accompanying notes 73-75.
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proof.""8 This procedural standard immediately raises the ex
ante costs of doing business with a gap debtor, because of the
risk that the trustee will attempt to avoid the transaction following the order for relief. At a minimum, the transferee must incur
the litigation costs of proving that the bargain was for valuable,
post-petition consideration. To compensate, the debtor will have
to offer a premium to the transferee. Yet, since value is so narrowly defined, the court will likely remit this premium to the estate. For example, in In re Jorges Carpet Mills, Inc., the court
allocated a market price to yarn and then forced the gap
transferee to reimburse the estate for the difference between the
transfer price and the judicially determined market value.9 In a
secured lending transaction, the securing or paying-off of past
indebtedness could constitute the premium. Courts, however,
have rejected this type of transaction for purposes of § 549(b),
which excludes value-securing debt that arose prior to the commencement of the case. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive
why a party with notice of the petition would do business with
the gap debtor without first obtaining court approval (with the
debtor agreeing to pay for the cost of the proceedings).
The narrow view of value also creates problems in the comparison between ex ante and ex post value. 100 Section 549 does
not define value, although the cases make clear that it will be
construed narrowly.' Thus, creditors of the estate are likely to
contest any transaction that involves the transfer of assets without a clear market price.' 2 How such a transaction should be
viewed depends on the purpose of the involuntary petition and its
related provisions. If the primary purpose of § 549(b) is to protect
the gap debtor and good-faith gap creditors, then the conception
of value should be ex ante-at the time of the transfer. If, however, the purpose is to preserve the estate, then perhaps the court
would assess value ex post-after the order of relief has been
granted (at least if the transferred property's value has declined).
This debate is particularly relevant to a transfer where the monetary value incorporates a measure of risk of an asset's appreciation or depreciation. A debtor may have an incentive to take on

11 USC Appendix, Rule 6001.
41 Bankr 60, 66 (Bankr E D Tenn 1984).
"0 For a discussion of the distinction between ex ante and ex post value, concluding
that ex ante value is the appropriate measure of transfer value for purposes of § 549(b),
see In the Matter of Texas Research, Inc., 862 F2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir 1989).
i See text accompanying notes 86-88.
Except, of course, where the net present value of such a suit is negative.
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risky investments if the only way to salvage the business is to
cash in on a big investment.13 Consequently, in this situation,
the court will be forced to evaluate, ex post, the ex ante risk factors associated with such a transfer.
Finally, an overly narrow reading of § 549 imposes a substantial recording burden on gap-period transactions. In In re
Butcher, the court disallowed a transfer of $10,000 during the
gap period where the transferee (an attorney) failed to produce
adequate records demonstrating that he in fact performed services during the gap period. 1 4 The need to keep records may prove
a trivial concern for most attorneys (although apparently not in
this case), but only because attorneys generally maintain detailed
records of their billable activities.
Record keeping constitutes a more onerous burden, however,
in those relationships that normally have no need for such exactitude or in contexts in which it is difficult to apportion value between pre-petition and post-petition transfers. The gap debtor is
most likely to do business with parties with whom the debtor has
a pre-existing relationship. This is in the best interests of all
concerned since the transaction costs of continued operations
with these parties are relatively low. However, in ongoing business relationships, there is likely to be outstanding debt and
contemporaneous transfers. The precise matching of these exchanges may be extremely difficult and may result in a breakdown in relations.0 5 Finally, continuing the business relationship after the petition has been filed would be dangerous for the
non-debtor due to the limited priority protection for unsecured
claims as well as the ambiguity surrounding the granting of security interests.
Furthermore, the timing component of the narrow conception
of value severely limits its applicability. "The value exchanged for
the transfer must be received by the debtor prior to or simultaneously with the transfer." 6 Since the value may not be ex-

" Of course, this may be a practice the Code ought to discourage. See text accompanying note 63-67.
104 69 Bankr 198, 203 (Bankr E D Tenn 1986).
1
The opportunities for disagreement are legion. In particular, the gap debtor may
have an implied obligation to notify the third party of the involuntary petition. With or
without notification, each party will have conflicting incentives for investing in accurate
record keeping detailing the timing and nature of their transactions. Ultimately, a court
will have to adjudicate these interests, often after a lengthy delay since priority would not
be determined until well after the order for relief.
1"6 Williams ContractFurniture, 148 Bankr at 808. In Williams, the court allowed the
trustee to avoid two post-petition credit card payments made by the involuntary debtor.
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changed for pre-petition debt, this creates an extremely narrow
window in which the debtor may operate. Finally, a mere promise was also held to be insufficient value, although it clearly is
valuable, particularly considering the trustee's ability to assume
executory contracts pursuant to § 365.
In conclusion, the Roxy Roller approach to the extension of
gap-period credit is a conservative baseline to the extent it rejects
innovative approaches. Although the gap debtor lacks trustee
status and therefore may not resort to § 364 credit enhancement,
it may grant a security interest without court approval in exchange for value, narrowly construed. The two criticisms of Roxy
Roller are inconsistent, but they both point to the same shortcoming: the gap debtor's inability to obtain optimal levels of credit. The gap-debtor-as-trustee position suggests that § 364 and its
court-supervised granting of super-priority status may ameliorate
this problem. In contrast, the second criticism proposes a broader
understanding of value and relies on the marketplace, rather
than the courts, to provide the gap debtor with the optimal level
of credit. Each of these alternatives will now be considered on its
own merits.
C. Flexible Understanding of Value
The gap debtor would enjoy the greatest degree of discretion
in continuing operations under an approach featuring a broader §
549(b) understanding of value. Section 549 creates one of the
trustee's avoiding powers." 7 While the other avoiding sections
apply to pre-petition transfers, § 549 serves the necessary role of
regulating both the debtor-in-possession following the filing of a
voluntary Chapter 11 petition and the gap debtor following the
filing of an involuntary petition. Section 549(b) excepts gap-period transfers for value from the post-order-for-relief trustee avoiding powers. This exception is crucial to the gap debtor's ability to
continue normal business operations without violating the § 362
automatic stay.

Id at 808-09. The court did not accept the credit card company's argument "that value was
provided in the form of an extension of credit which allowed the debtor to make purchases
through the next billing cycle." Id at 809. See also In the Matter of Bridges Enterprises,
Inc., 44 Bankr 979, 984-85 (Bankr S D Ohio 1984) (voiding the transfer between a creditor
and a gap debtor when the creditor cashed a pre-petition check during the involuntary
gap period).
" See note 28.
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An alternative to the narrow judicial formulation of value
under § 549 looks to how other statutory avoiding sections define
value. Section 547, which governs preferential transfers, also
contains an exception for exchanges that result in new value. °8
Section 547 defines "new value" as:
money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or
release by a transferee of property previously transferred to
such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor
voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable
law, including proceeds of such property, but [ I not includ[ing] an obligation substituted for an existing obligation ....1"
This definition, as interpreted by the courts, would allow greater
debtor flexibility since it is more responsive to the type of financing relationships that a financially troubled debtor requires. For
example, under this definition, the authorization of new credit in
the form of a guarantee constitutes sufficient value to support a
transfer. 110
This definition of value, however, is not so nebulous as to
defeat the § 547 purpose of preventing debtor transfers to favored
creditors. In one case, an undersecured creditor's forbearance
from exercising a default option was deemed not to be new value,
since any creditor could claim forbearance while seeking a preferential transfer."' In addition, the definition of value can be limited by a second pre-petition avoiding power: the fraudulent conveyance avoidance of § 548. This section authorizes the trustee to
avoid a pre-petition transfer to the extent the debtor "received
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation.""' This approach places primary focus on
§ 303(f) in that its central concern is the continued operation of
the gap debtor's business, free from undue restrictions. It seeks
equity and efficiency by optimizing the debtor's freedom during
the gap period.

"0 See 11 USC § 547(c)(1) and (4).
'0 11 USC § 547(a)(2).

See In re Kumar Bavishi & Associates, 906 F2d 942, 945 (3d Cir 1990) (holding
that a guarantee essential to receiving new credit, obtained by payment of pre-existing
debt, was "new value" under § 547(a)(2)).
. See Drabkin v AL. Credit Corp., 800 F2d 1153, 1158-59 (DC Cir 1986).
" 11 USC § 548(a)(2)(A). For an involuntary case that directly links the § 549 value
exception with § 548, see In re Brooklyn Overall Co., Inc., 57 Bankr 999, 1002-03 (Bankr
E D NY 1986).
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The obvious criticism of the more permissive interpretation
of § 549 value is that it is too generous to gap debtors-entities
that probably are on the verge of being declared bankrupt. Extending new credit to the gap debtor may deprive pre-petition
creditors of what little value remains in the firm while the debtor
squanders the newly acquired funds on risky projects. Thus, a
narrower understanding of value is necessary to ensure that
secured creditors fulfill their monitoring function.
A second criticism is that a broad view of value substantially
increases the risk of camouflaged preferencing as the debtor
liquidates assets prior to the order of relief. The debtor and
transferee could use § 549(b) as an absolute shield to avoidance.
Additionally, since the gap debtor substantially controls the
length of the gap period, the statute of limitations for post-relief
avoidance could conceivably lapse."'
D. The Gap Debtor as Trustee
A fourth approach views the gap debtor as a trustee under
both § 364 and other provisions of the Code." This approach
has the advantage of allowing the gap debtor to appear before
the court to seek enhanced security (including super-priority
liens) for post-petition credit under § 364. However, trustee status would also require the debtor to fulfill all of the fiduciary
duties of a trustee. This would limit the debtor's discretion to run
the business as if there had been no petition, a condition contrary
to § 303(f).
This argument requires a statutory basis for treating the gap
debtor as a trustee. Proponents primarily rely on § 1107, which
authorizes a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession to exercise most of
the powers and duties of a trustee."' Section 1101 defines
"debtor in possession" to mean any debtor when a trustee has not
been appointed. Finally, § 101(13) defines "debtor" as any entity
against whom a case has been commenced, not differentiating
between a gap debtor and a post-order-for-relief debtor.

...The statute of limitations for § 549 claims is no longer than two years. See 11 USC
§ 549(d); text accompanying notes 16-17.
14 This approach was discussed earlier as the first refutation to the Roxy Roller view.
See text accompanying notes 89-96. For a discussion supporting the treatment of gap
debtors as trustees under the § 364 approach, see Baisier and Epstein, 27 Wake Forest L
Rev at 118-21 (cited in note 76).
5 This statutory argument is developed in Baisier and Epstein. Id at 120.
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Some courts have relied on this definitional argument to
appoint Chapter 11 trustees during the gap period. In Chapter 7
cases, § 303(g) specifically authorizes the court to appoint an
interim trustee. Although there is no comparable authorization
for Chapter 11 cases, the court in In re ProfessionalAccountants
Referral Services, Inc. appointed a trustee pursuant to § 1104
prior to the entry of an order for relief."' The court's decision to
appoint an interim trustee was influenced by the debtor's improper behavior and by the probability that the debtor would be put
into bankruptcy when the petition was adjudicated." 7
There are two primary criticisms of the § 364 approach. The
first, already mentioned, identifies the inconsistency between
applying § 364 and § 303(f)." 8 This view argues that the duties
and powers of the trustee, imposed by § 364 and other Code provisions, would hamper the debtor's ability to conduct its business.
Section 365, for example, authorizes the trustee, subject to
court approval, to assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor. The application of § 365 could
cause the gap debtor to lose beneficial contracts, since potential
contract partners would be reluctant to contract with a party
that can assume or reject the contract." 9 The use of this power
is of course subject to court approval, and a court would likely
take a dim view of an attempt to abuse it. However, if the goal is
to maximize the value of the estate, the court might be dutybound to approve the action.
An additional complication is the uncertain treatment of
executory contracts rejected by the debtor during the gap period
following dismissal of the petition. Although the inquiry may be

116 142 Bankr 424, 429-30 (Bankr D Colo 1992).

"'7 Id at 429. Interestingly, the court appointed a trustee despite the debtor's contention that "the Petitioning Creditors' claims are contested, unliquidated and, therefore,
that these Creditors may not be proper petitioning creditors." Id at 429 n 16.
For a contrary view, see In the Matter of BeaucrestRealty Associates, 4 Bankr 164,
165 (Bankr E D NY 1980), which held that an interim Chapter 11 trustee could not be
appointed during the gap period. The court found that § 1104(a), which governs the
appointment of trustees in Chapter 11 cases, makes no mention of such an interim entity.
Id. In addition, Congress explicitly provided for an interim trustee in Chapter 7 cases. 11
USC § 303(g). No such provision governs for Chapter 11. Id. Therefore, the court argued
that "to infer such a provision ... is to do violence to sound statutory construction." Id.
18 See text accompanying note 82.
"'
The potential applicability of § 365 raises additional concerns for gap debtors. In In
re TS Industries, Inc., 117 Bankr 682, 685 (Bankr D Utah 1990), the court found that
those dealing with the debtor cannot protect themselves contractually, because the statute
governing the assumption and rejection of executory contracts (§ 365(e)(1)) invalidates
ipso facto clauses that terminate or modify a contract in the event of bankruptcy.
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fact-specific, such a contract is probably permanently avoided,
leaving the contracting party with no recourse save a damages
action. 20 This scenario raises the unattractive possibility of a
collusive involuntary petition filed by an outside creditor to free
the debtor from an undesired contract.' 2 '
Section 365 thus highlights the debtor's conflict of interest in
acting as a fiduciary for the creditors while fighting the petition
and trying to preserve a viable business for the equity owners.'2 2 A debtor is duty-bound to avoid contracts disadvantageous to the unsecured creditors. Although rejection of a particular contract might benefit the estate should it enter bankruptcy
(because the damage claim would be reduced to pro-rata sharing),
it could have a disastrous effect should the debtor stay out of
bankruptcy (because the debtor would be responsible for normal
contractual damage liability).' Consequently, the gap debtor
would be placed in the difficult position of choosing between the
fiduciary duties demanded by trustee status and practical business judgment.2
The second objection to trustee status for the gap debtor is
the resulting divergent treatment of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
debtors. Chapter 7 does not provide for the debtor-in-possession;
therefore, the Chapter 7 debtor is unable to access post-petition
credit under § 364. This inequality of treatment may result in a
strategic decision by creditors to file under Chapter 7 or 11 based
not upon the merits of the case, but rather on the freedom of
action the debtor will have during the gap period.'25

120

This is a largely speculative endeavor since there are few, if any, reported cases in

which a gap debtor rejects an executory contract.
121 Courts exacerbate this problem when they adopt a rescission-based view of § 365.
See, for example, In re Register, 95 Bankr 73, 74 (Bankr M D Ten 1989) (allowing the
debtor to reject a covenant not to compete as an executory contract).
'" See Triantis, 46 Vand L Rev at 914 (cited in note 66) for a discussion of judicial
treatment of these conflicting fiduciary duties in voluntary debtor-in-possession cases.
Triantis also discusses the additional problem of managerial incentives to prevent liquidation so as to retain their jobs. Id at 916-17. Managers may have the incentive to fight an
involuntary petition even when the company may belong in bankruptcy.
12 See Roxy Roller, 73 Bankr at 527 ("It is a sensible statutory scheme to preclude the
debtor from taking advantage of the powers of the Bankruptcy Code... while the debtor
opposes the entry for an order for relief and when no order for relief may ever be entered.").
12 See generally Nimmer and Feinberg, 6 Bankr Dev J 1 (cited in note 50).
22 Note, however, that there is already a statutory divergence between Chapter 7 and
11 involuntary petitions regarding the authority to appoint an interim trustee. See 11
USC § 303(g); text accompanying notes 116-17.
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Although proponents argue that it is within the debtor's
power to mitigate the divergence between Chapters 7 and 11,126
none of the proposed steps are truly satisfactory. First, a Chapter
7 involuntary debtor may move to convert the case to Chapter
112 and thereby attain the benefits of a debtor-in-possession.
This choice, however, is tantamount to capitulating to the involuntary petition since conversion would result in the gap debtor
being declared bankrupt and fully subject to the limitations of a
debtor-in-possession."2 Although the debtor may subsequently
move to dismiss the case for cause, dismissal requires the debtor
first to demonstrate adequate cause and then to carry the burden
of proof. Finally, conversion would likely render moot any defenses or damages action the debtor might have against petitioning creditors under § 303(i). A second alternative would be for a
Chapter 7 gap debtor to move, pursuant to § 303(g), for court
appointment of an interim trustee. Such action is appropriate,
however, only "if necessary to preserve the property of the estate
or to prevent loss to the estate." 9 The appointment of an interim trustee also dispossesses the debtor of its ability to manage
the business. 3 '
There are therefore four approaches to the question of the
gap debtor's ability to obtain secured credit. Those solutions
granting the debtor considerable power may be faulted for endangering the interests of pre-petition creditors, while those denying
the debtor the ability to secure gap-period financing may be challenged on the grounds that they reduce the going-concern value
of the enterprise. Determining which approach courts should
embrace requires recourse to the policy concerns underlying
bankruptcy and the financial circumstances of gap debtors.
III. IN SUPPORT OF DEBTOR FLEXIBILITY
This Comment argues that the flexible definition of value
discussed in Section II should govern during the gap period.
Therefore, under normal conditions,' 3 ' the gap debtor should be
allowed to grant a security interest in property in exchange for
1" These arguments (but not the counter-arguments) are developed in Baisier and Epstein, 27 Wake Forest L Rev at 121-22 (cited in note 76).
'
See 11 USC § 706(a).
'2 11 USC § 348.

1- 11 USC § 303(g).
"0 See text accompanying notes 116-17.
131

"Normal conditions" refers to cases in which the court does not appoint a trustee

pursuant to § 303(g).
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value, as defined by § 547. Read broadly, the § 549(b) exception
for value can serve the same purpose as the § 547 exception: "to
encourage creditors to deal with troubled businesses." 32 Allowing transfers for new value provides the debtor with an opportunity to overcome its insolvency and is therefore beneficial to the
estate. 133 If the court does issue a final order for relief, the value definition should protect creditors from fraudulent conveyances by incorporating the "reasonably equivalent value" standard of
§ 548.13 This standard serves the policy goal of continuity in
the treatment of voluntary and involuntary petitions.
The proposed approach would allow the gap debtor to seek
secured financing during the gap period without court approval.
The only limitation on the debtor's financing ability would be the
willingness of creditors to infuse "new value" into the business.
Such willingness would reflect the merit of the projects the debtor proposes to accomplish and the quality of collateral that it can
offer. Three additional reasons, outlined below, support this reading of the Code.
A. Congressional Intent
Section 549 authorizes transactions creating post-petition
value, and § 303(f) authorizes the gap debtor to continue business as normal. Both of these broad statements express a clear
intent, 135 yet they cause ambiguities in practice. The prevailing
definition of value is derived not from the Code, but from a procedural Bankruptcy Rule which applies generally to all post-petition transfers. 136 This rule has the substantive effect of frustrating the liberal intent of the drafters of §§ 303(f) and 549(b).

" See In re BellancaAircraft Corp., 850 F2d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir 1988), quoting In re
Almarc Manufacturing,Inc., 62 Bankr 684, 687-88 (Bankr N D Ill 1986).
13 See In re American International Airways, Inc., 56 Bankr 551, 554-55 (E D Pa
1986) (finding payment for new inventory is not a preferential transfer).
4 The reasonable-equivalence standard is more conducive to the gap debtor's business situation than the narrow definition of value since it does not insist on a dollar-fordollar accounting. Instead, the standard depends on all the facts and circumstances of
each case, including the fair market value of the exchange and whether the parties were
engaged in an arm's length transaction. See In the Matter of Bundles, 856 F2d 815, 824
(7th Cir 1988). See also In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 904 F2d 588, 594-95 (11th Cir
1990) (finding that loan proceeds in exchange for a guarantee of a much greater dollar
amount can be reasonably equivalent value). For a discussion of the applicability of
§ 548's value standard to § 549, see Brooklyn Overall, 57 Bankr at 1002-03.
See text accompanying notes 22-23, 27-30.
11 USC Appendix, Rule 6001.
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Section 362 provides some insight into Congress's view of the
gap debtor. In In re Oxford Dev., Ltd., the court considered the
benefits the automatic stay offers to gap debtors. 1" 7 The court
observed: "It can only be assumed that Congress felt putative
debtors should be free from all other concerns while the question
of bankruptcy is at issue thereby allowing the debtor to concentrate exclusively on that one issue."3 ' This reading of § 362
supports a liberal treatment of the debtor's business relationships during the gap period. Courts, however, have bypassed
such an integrated approach in favor of piecemeal treatment-adjudicating individual disputes over specific Code sections in isolation. The gap debtor, however, is accorded special
treatment throughout the Code, and courts should reflect this
implicit congressional policy directive when they interpret the
individual provisions. In short, to the extent the debtor avoids
fraudulent or preferential transactions, business should be allowed to continue as normal.
B. Efficiency
1. The costs of ambiguity.
The prevailing Roxy Roller understanding of value imposes
significant costs. Ambiguity encourages strategic gamesmanship
because the creditor can exert significant leverage over the more
vulnerable debtor.' The more the debtor fears the consequences of the involuntary gap period, the more likely it is to capitulate to creditor demands, thus encouraging more threats by other
creditors. 4 ' Conversely, ambiguity may also reduce the incen-

115 Bankr 216 (Bankr W D Mo 1990).
'3 Id at 217.
" This occurs where a petitioning creditor files so as to prevent the debtor from
13

paying a third party. See, for example, Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V. v Hallwood
Industries, Inc., 133 Bankr 176, 178 (W D Pa 1991). Enhancing the debtor's ability to pay
gap creditors contemporaneously would discourage this type of opportunism. Additionally,
effective enforcement of § 303(i) sanctions would be helpful.
In extreme cases, the court can mitigate the damage from a strategic filing of the involuntary petition through abstention pursuant to 11 USC § 305(a)(1). See, for example,
In the Matter of Investment Corporationof North America, 39 Bankr 758, 759 (Bankr S D
Fla 1984) (dismissing an involuntary petition where disgruntled creditors were seeking to
gain control of the debtor's business).
10 The threat of involuntary bankruptcy may be used, not only for strategic advantage
by creditors, but by limited partners as well. See Note, What Do You Mean My Partnership Has Been Petitioned Into Bankruptcy?, 19 Fordham Urban L J 833, 833-34, 840-46
(1992).
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tives for proper involuntary filing because errors in court approval can dissipate the estate during the gap period.
There are two types of errors that may result from ambiguity
in the court approval requirement. The first type arises when a
gap debtor unnecessarily seeks court approval. This is a common
occurrence, yet if the Roxy Roller court is correct (and § 364 thus
does not apply to gap debtors), the court may lack authority to
approve the lending transaction. This not only proves costly to
the debtor because of attorneys' fees and lost opportunities, but
also wastes limited judicial resources.
The second type of error occurs when the debtor does not
seek court approval, but the court later decides that approval
was necessary. To preserve the transaction, the gap creditor or
gap transferee must seek nunc pro tunc approval of the claim. It
is extremely difficult, however, to obtain such relief. In In re J.L.
Graphics, Inc., the court decided that it should never authorize
such retroactive approval under the current Bankruptcy
Code.'
Courts are apparently hostile to such "fall back"4 2
treatment because they prefer that parties protect their rights ex
ante. Some courts will grant nunc pro tunc relief only when the
claimant can meet a three-part standard that requires: (1) that
the court would have granted approval had the application been
timely; (2) that no creditor has been hurt by the continuation of
the business allowed by the loan; and (3) that the debtor and
creditor honestly believed that they could enter into the loan
transaction without approval.
Other courts require even more
"compelling" or "extraordinary" circumstances than those necessary to fulfill the above standard.' Since ex post court approval is unlikely, disadvantaging one individual creditor could potentially undo even a value-increasing transaction. Such preference
for an individual creditor over the estate as a whole directly
contradicts the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.

141

62 Bankr 750, 755-56 (Bankr D NH 1986).

142 See In re Photo PromotionAssociates, Inc., 87 Bankr 835, 840-41 (Bankr S D NY

1988).
" See In re Lite Coal Mining Co., 122 Bankr 692, 695-96 (Bankr N D W Va 1990), citing In re American Cooler Co., Inc., 125 F2d 496 (2d Cir 1942).
14 See, for example, In the Matter of Grand Valley Sport & Marine, Inc., 143 Bankr
840, 851-52 (Bankr W D Mich 1992) (holding that in addition to the Lite Coal requirements, the "equities must strongly favor the creditor and there must be an 'absence of
prejudice to any interested party'").
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2. Transaction costs of seeking court approval.
The transaction costs of seeking court approval are also significant-particularly to a credit-starved debtor. In In re Shah
International,Inc., the court granted approval for the debtor to
execute mortgages as security for payment of its attorneys. 45
Although the transaction was admittedly essential to the successful defense of the estate, the court added extensive terms and
conditions to the exchange: continuing oversight of the fee
structure with periodic reporting requirements, restricting the
strength of the security agreement to the administrative expense
level, prohibiting cross-collateralization, and providing for notice
to other creditors. " 6 Since these measures involved attorneys'
fees, they may have been justified and within the ordinary sphere
of the bankruptcy court. However, a court will likely extend similar treatment to any business arrangement where a gap debtor
seeks court approval. Therefore, high transaction and ambiguity
costs make it more difficult to find businesses willing to conduct
operations with the gap debtor. The flexible approach, therefore,
maximizes the value of the estate by allowing the gap debtor to
seek new credit free from the burdens of repeatedly obtaining
court approval. Protection for pre-petition creditors will come
from the gap lenders' incentives, court action in extraordinary
cases, and the "reasonably equivalent value" component of the
flexible value standard.
C. Equity and the Inadequacy of Corrective Measures
In addition to efficiency, the Code seeks equity for the legitimate interests of debtors and creditors. The restrictions placed on
the gap period increase the risk to financially vulnerable debtors
of threatened or actual bad faith filings. These filings disturb
equity in two ways. First, a bad faith filing may harm the debtor
unjustly by preventing operations during the gap period, thereby
causing loss of the business's going-concern value. Second, the
threat of bad faith filings inequitably advantages one class of
creditors-those willing to threaten an involuntary petition-at
the expense of all other creditors.
There are two ways the Code may approach the problem of
frivolous or bad faith filings. One way is to deprive the petitioners of any coercive bargaining advantage from filing a petition by
94 Bankr 136, 138-39 (Bankr E D Wis 1988).
"

Id at 139.
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ensuring that the gap debtor may continue business operations.
The second way is to deter creditors from bad faith filings with
compensatory and punitive damage awards. Although a combination of the two approaches may be essential to prevent undesirable petitions from being filed, policy makers must also take care
to avoid deterring appropriate involuntary filings. If a filing is
appropriate, the petitioning creditors should not be deterred by
the fact that the debtor will continue to have opportunities to
raise credit for the estate. Enhanced penalties for unsuccessful
and bad faith petitions, however, may deter even well-intentioned
creditors by exacerbating the collective action problem.147
For a variety of practical reasons, the corrective measures
enumerated in § 303(i) may prove inadequate to protect the gap
debtor from petition filings that are not in the joint interests of
all creditors. The courts have been willing to impose damages in
cases of bad faith. In In re Wavelength, Inc., the court imposed
punitive damages for a frivolous, bad faith filing of an involuntary petition, using an objective standard that asked what a reasonable person would have believed concerning the debtor's solvency.'48 Such a standard, although the most practical rule, is
fraught with the danger of inconsistent application
(as is any
factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
review). Additionally, the necessary bad faith may well be difficult to prove, as long as the creditor can show some evidence of
the debtor's financial difficulty. In In re Turner, for example, the
court applied Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and held that the petitioning
creditors had at least an arguable Chapter 7 case and were not
primarily maliciously motivated. 5 ° Thus, § 303(i) will not necessarily prevent threats of filings that cause the debtor to make a
preferential transfer or otherwise behave in a suboptimal manner. 5 '

147

Raising the costs of filing for an individual petitioning creditor also increases the

incentive to free ride off the efforts of another creditor.
'4
61 Bankr 614, 619-20 (9th Cir BAP 1986). See also Camelot, Inc. v Hayden, 30
Bankr 409, 411 (E D Tenn 1983) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages for a bad
faith filing); In re Godroy Wholesale Co., Inc., 37 Bankr 496, 501 (Bankr D Mass 1984)
(finding that punitive damages may be awarded).
4
See 11 USC Appendix, Rule 8013.
1580 Bankr 618, 623-24, 628 (Bankr D Mass 1987).
...One example of this conflict arises in the context of a supplier of commercial paper
whose business creditors are contractually restricted from filing an involuntary petition.
Other creditors that have the power to make such threats will have a favored position as
debts come due. It is unclear, however, whether they are the most economically important
creditors to pay off.
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CONCLUSION

The gap debtor's current status is unclear due to conflicting
statutory provisions and the disjointed analysis employed by the
bankruptcy courts in interpreting individual provisions of the
Code-an analysis without reference to the interrelationship of
the statute and considerations of equity and efficiency. The
debtor's ability to conduct business, particularly to grant security
interests, during the gap period is thus shrouded in uncertainty.
The inability of the debtor to be assured of continued viability in
the face of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding undermines the
policies animating the Bankruptcy Code.
This Comment suggests an alternative to the present ambiguity, one that provides the debtor with a full opportunity to obtain adequate credit during the gap period without the handicap
of court oversight. This approach requires only a slight modification of the prevailing view: substituting the established definition
of value from § 547 in place of the judicially created narrow definition of value. Although this refinement increases the risk of
debtor misbehavior, the unique qualities of the gap period justify
that risk because it best accords with congressional intent and
the interests of both debtors and creditors.

